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tempers the sensational with frank as-
sessments of China’s limitations.
At the heart of this examination of Chi-
nese submarines, practically speaking, is
the potential showdown over Taiwan.
While Howarth notes that “China, like
Germany, is handicapped by geogra-
phy,” he points out that the defense of
Taiwan is equally handicapped by
oceanography: its narrow and crowded
seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His
frankness, however, about such U.S.
problems as naval drawdown, global re-
sponsibility, vulnerability of surface
ships to missile saturation, and the dif-
ficulties of operations in narrow seas
gives one new pause.
As an example of what is best about his
work, Howarth considers not only the
tactical problems for China, Taiwan,
and the United States (including the
exact requirements for successful sub-
marine warfare against a carrier-based
navy) but also the proper political con-
text of that potential conflict—that a
politically free and economically pros-
perous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at
the heart of the legitimacy of the Chi-
nese Communist Party. Returning to
the intersection of tactics and strategic
judgment, Howarth includes in his final
chapter an economical summary of the
logic by which Chinese decision makers
might be optimistic enough about their
chances for success to initiate a conflict
with Taiwan.
One weakness in this confluence of pol-
itics, strategy, and tactical matchups is
that Howarth exaggerates the strategic
influence of the great thinkers on policy.
His demonstration of how submarine
warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches,
suggesting as it does that submarine
warfare fits perfectly with preformed
Chinese strategic preferences. The logic
of a preemptive surprise attack is part
of the Chinese strategic culture, he says,
but one does not have to cite the num-
ber of wars per year in which the Ming
dynasty engaged, for example, in order
to support the conclusion that “the
Pentagon has some justification in con-
sidering that the risk of Beijing resort-
ing to force to try to resolve the Taiwan
issue is growing with the modernization
and transformation of the PRC’s mili-
tary capabilities.”
Howarth is better off with his more ele-
gant logic that submarines are designed
for the task of concealment and sur-
prise and that surprise is a good tactic
when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern
and Western war planners have both
made use of the submarine and have
appreciated it for the qualities for which
it is designed, regardless of whether
they were Chinese or their ancient an-
cestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.
Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to
blend classic strategic thinking with
current politics and tactical complexi-
ties that is informative, intelligent, and
provocative in this book. It is recom-
mended for any library on naval affairs
or Asian conflict, and good reading for
both U.S. and Chinese war planners.
PETER J. WOOLLEY
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and
Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp.
$125
Given the importance of the Taiwan is-
sue for U.S. foreign and security policy
in East Asia, it is striking that relatively
little has been written on Taiwan’s de-
fense reform and modernization
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programs, especially in contrast to the
substantial amount of work scholars
and policy analysts have produced in
recent years on Chinese military mod-
ernization and its implications for re-
gional security. Bernard Cole’s Taiwan’s
Security: History and Prospects, which
provides a comprehensive and well
written assessment of recent develop-
ments in Taiwan’s defense establish-
ment, represents an important step in
filling this gap.
In this work, Cole—a respected China
scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for
thirty years and is now professor of inter-
national history at the National War
College—examines the changes cur-
rently under way in Taiwan’s armed
forces and defense bureaucracy. The
main purpose of Cole’s thorough and
well researched study is to assess
changes in Taiwan’s defense posture
and their implications for the island’s
security. After presenting a brief history
of Taiwan’s military and an overview of
the Chinese military threat, Cole ex-
plains that Taiwan in recent years has
been unwilling to increase the level of
resources devoted to its own military
capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorga-
nizing its defense bureaucracy and its
military is professional and well trained,
the growing asymmetry in defense
spending between Taiwan and China is
resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s
long-standing qualitative edge over the
Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues
quite persuasively that the cross-strait
military balance is tipping toward
China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively
modest response to the growing security
challenge represented by the accelera-
tion of Chinese military modernization.
Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend
itself on its own and may not even be
able to hold out until the U.S. military
could intervene decisively.
Cole also includes a brief discussion of
the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwill-
ingness to do more to counter China’s
growing military capability. He argues,
first, that many officials in Taiwan be-
lieve Chinese military threats lack cred-
ibility and, second, that decision
makers in Taipei are convinced that the
United States would come to Taiwan’s
assistance even if they turn out to have
underestimated China’s willingness to
use force. According to Cole, the U.S.
decision to send two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the region during the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only
convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan
would likely result in American military
intervention but also led Taipei to the
same conclusion. Given the assump-
tions that China lacks the willingness to
use force and that U.S. intervention is
virtually assured in the unlikely event of
a cross-strait conflict, many politicians
in Taiwan conclude that the island does
not really need to invest its own scarce
resources in defense. In all, Taiwan’s
Security makes an important contribu-
tion to scholarship and policy analysis
by providing a readable and informative
assessment of a previously understud-
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